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INTRODUCTION

In October 1982 Congress passed new legislation, the Export
* Of Counsel, Baker & Hostetler, Washington, D.C.; former Chief, Foreign
Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice; author of FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (3d ed. 1982).
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Trading Company Act of 1982 (Export Act),1 providing for an exemption from the antitrust laws for export trade. This new legislation incorporates the standards of the existing Webb-Pomerene
Export Trade Act (Webb Act) with that of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act),2 and adds a certification
procedure for export companies and associations to provide more
protection from antitrust liability to such companies and associations. The Senate Export Trading Company bill would have
amended the Webb Act to embrace the new certification procedure and transfer the administration of the Webb Act from the
Federal Trade Commission to the Secretary of Commerce. Paradoxically, the legislation, as enacted, does not amend the Webb
Act, but leaves it intact. Title IV of the new Act restates the standards for application of the Sherman Act to export trade to clarify such criteria.
This Article discusses the history of the Webb Act as a prelude
to a discussion of the new legislation. Because the standards in
the new Export Act are similar to those in the Webb Act, the
precedents under the Webb Act will remain important for interpreting the new legislation. Furthermore, a review of the Webb
Act and of the alternatives proposed over the years gives an insight into the reasoning behind having an export exception to the
antitrust laws.
There is always a move to spur United States exports during
periods of a deficit in the United States balance of payments.
This is as it should be. At such times analysts search for impediments to United States export, and the antitrust laws usually are
singled out as one of the impediments. That is the case now. It is
paradoxical that an exemption to the antitrust laws for export
should have been considered a barrier to export trade, but some
argued that the Webb Act has not provided an adequate exemption. Thus, some say that exporters hesitated to join together to
use the Act because of a fear that the Justice Department would
sue them for price fixing or cartel behavior despite the Act's
exemption.
On the other hand-usually in more favorable economic climates-some officials of the Antitrust Division of the United
States Department of Justice have urged the repeal of the exemp1. Pub. L. No. 97-290, [4 Federal Laws] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) § 27,000.
2. Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976 & Supp. IV
1981); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).

Fall 1982]

EXPORT TRADE EXCEPTION

tion.3 Supporters of this view have suggested that the Webb Act
has never significantly helped to increase United States export
trade because the trade of Webb associations has averaged only
about five percent of United States exports and now represents

less than two percent. They also have contended that United
States exporters no longer face foreign buying cartels, one of the
original reasons for passage of the Webb Act. Furthermore, small
companies, for which the Webb Act primarily was designed, have
not taken advantage of it. Finally and most importantly, they
have suggested that the exemption is inconsistent with United
States antitrust policy generally. The goal of the newly enacted
legislation is to bolster the antitrust exemption for exports rather
than limit the exemption. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives had this objective in mind, but the House bill sought
to circumscribe the exemption more extensively.
When considered in perspective, the balance of payments deficit is not a brand new problem. United States exports for 1981
were $233.7 billion, and imports were $261.3 billion, leaving a
trade deficit of $27.6 billion. In 1978 the deficit was
greater-31.1 billion (exports totaled $143.7 billion while imports were $174.8 billion).4 The last year the United States had a
balance of payments surplus was 1975, when exports were $107.7
billion and imports were $98.5 billion, leaving a surplus of $9.1
billion.5 The preceding figures indicate some very favorable factors: exports as well as imports have increased greatly (even taking account of inflation), and the trade deficit in 1981 was not
proportionately as large as it was in 1978. Accordingly, our export
performance has not been particularly poor. Furthermore, even if
antitrust law impedes export, there surely are many more impor-

tant factors which affect export performance.
The Webb Act has been reconsidered repeatedly during the
years since its passage in 1918. The most recent reconsideration,
aside from congressional consideration of the Export Trading
3. See Interview with Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield, ANTIREP. (BNA) No. 875, at AA-3 (Aug. 8, 1978); Turner,
United States Antitrust Policy and American Foreign Commerce, 1967 Sw. LEGAL FOUND. 206; see also Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm. pursuant to S. Res. 65, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 62 (1963) (statement of L. Loevinger).
4. Figures furnished by United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of
International Trade. The deficit is worsening in 1982.
5. Id.
TRUST & TRADE REG.
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Company Act, was by the National Committee for the Review of
the Antitrust Laws and Procedures.6 A special business-oriented

panel appointed to aid the committee favored strengthening the
Act,7 but the Commission itself took a rather negative view of it.
In addition, the Business Practices Committee of the Organiza-

tion for Economic Cooperation and Development has made a
study" of the operation of export associations or "export cartels"

which will be described in a subsequent section.
This Article will examine the Webb Act and its operation; the
courts' treatment of the Webb Act; the manifold suggestions and
recommendations for amending, changing, repealing, or replacing

it; and finally, the new Export Trading Company Act of 1982 and
the changes it made.
II. ANOMALOUS NATURE OF THE WEBB ACT-SEPARATION OF
RESTRAINTS ON DOMESTIC TRADE AND FOREIGN TRADE

In general, the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act 9 permits
United States companies to combine for the purpose of engaging
in export trade, and, provided they stay within the limits of the
Webb Act, such activity is exempt from the Sherman Act. 10 Section 1 of the Webb Act defines the terms used, including "export
trade," which means "solely trade or commerce in goods, wares,

6.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL

(1979).
7. Export Trade Companies and Trade Associations: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on InternationalFinance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1979) (report of Business Advisory Panel on Antitrust Export Issues).
COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES

8. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE OF EXPORTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (1974).

9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981). For background on the WebbPomerene Act, see W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 7
(3d ed. 1982);

REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO

STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 109-14 (1955); McDermid, The Antitrust Commission and the Webb-Pomerene Act: A CriticalAssessment, 37 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 105 (1980); Allison, Antitrust and Foreign Trade: Exemption for Export
Associations, 11 Hous. L. REV. 11, 24 (1974); Chapman, Exports and Antitrust:
Must Competition Stop at the Water's Edge?, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319
(1973); Note, The Webb-Pomerene Act: A Reexamination of Export Cartels in
World Trade, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 151 (1978).
Some of the descriptive material herein has been adapted from W. FUGATE,
supra.
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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or merchandise exported or in the course of being exported from
the United States or a territory thereof to any foreign nation. .

.. "I'

Section 2 provides that nothing in the Sherman Act

shall be construed as declaring illegal an association entered into
"for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and actually engaged solely in export trade," or acts done or agreements made in
the course of such export trade. Section 2, however, has two
provisos limiting Sherman Act exemption. First, such association,
or acts or agreements in pursuance thereof, may not be in restraint of trade within the United States or in restraint of the
export trade of any domestic competitor of the association. Second, the association may not, in the United States or elsewhere,
enter into any agreement, understanding, or conspiracy, or do any
act which "artificially or intentionally enhances or depresses
prices within the United States of commodities of the class exported by the association, or which substantially lessens competition within the United States or otherwise restrains trade
therein.

' 12

Section 3 provides an exemption from the merger pro-

visions of section 7 of the Clayton Act for a member company
buying stock in an export association.13 Section 4 broadens the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Act to include acts
committed outside of the United States. 4 Section 5 of the Webb
Act 15 requires all export associations subject to the Act to register
with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). An association that
fails to file faces a penalty of one hundred dollars per day, and
loses the benefits of the Act.16 If the Commission has reason to
believe that any act or agreement of the association is in restraint
of the export trade of any domestic competitor or has done anything to artificially raise or depress domestic prices, the Commission may investigate and make recommendations to the Attorney
General for whatever action he may deem proper. 17 This is much
less stringent than an antitrust suit, but, as later noted, the Supreme Court18 held that an antitrust suit may be brought against
11. Id. § 61.
12. Id. §62.
13. Id. § 63.
14. Id. § 64.
15. Id. §65.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 58 F. Supp. 785
(S.D.N.Y. 1944), aft'd, 325 U.S. 196 (1945) (jurisdictional issue), aff'd, 86 F.
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an association in addition to, or as a substitute for, an FTC
investigation.
The above provisions may indicate why there is considerable
apprehension in the business community regarding the use of the
exemption. The Webb Act exempts export associations from the
Sherman Act upon such strict conditions that the Sherman Act
appears to be reinforced with additional prohibitions against acts
in foreign trade that substantially lessen competition in the
United States or otherwise restrain trade therein. Furthermore,
the Webb Act specifically declares that the Federal Trade Commission Act applies to unfair methods of competition "without
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."1 Under section
5 the Commission is enjoined to watch such associations closely
for violations of the strict conditions imposed by the Act.20
The passage of the Webb Act was preceded by a Federal Trade
Commission Report in 1916.21 The 1916 FTC Report stressed the
importance of our foreign commerce and stated that one fact
which stood out sharply was the demand for cooperation among

manufacturers and producers in the export business. It also
pointed out that small businessmen were at a disadvantage in single-handedly attempting to enter foreign markets in the face of
powerful united competitors of other nations.22 The FTC Report,
however, mentioned two chief dangers of cooperative export organizations: (1) they might be used to exploit consumers in the
home market; and (2) they might be used unfairly against individual United States concerns involved in the export trade that
are not members of the organization.23
The 1916 FTC Report recommended passage of permissive legislation establishing the legality of cooperation in foreign trade
among United States producers but with safeguards against the
dangers mentioned above. 2 ' President Wilson, in his address to
Congress on December 5, 1916, urged enactment of the pending
Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (on the merits).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 64.
20. Id. § 65.
21.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE FTC ON THE OPERATION OF

THE EXPORT TRADE ACT (1916); see GILBERT, EXPORT PRICES AND EXPORT CARTELS 113 (TNEC Monograph No. 6, 1940).

22.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON COOPERATION IN AMERICAN Ex-

(1917).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 379-81.
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23.
24.
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legislation "to extend greater freedom of combination to those engaged in promoting the foreign commerce of the country than is
now thought by some to be legal under the terms of the laws
against monopoly ....

,2

5

He asked for a law that would "give

freedom without permitting unregulated license."2 6
As the 1916 FTC Report pointed out, the sponsors of the bill
stated that the purpose of the legislation was to enable United
States businessmen to compete with foreign competitors on an
equal footing and, particularly, to aid small businesses.2 7 The advantage to small businesses set forth in the FTC Report was that
small businessmen could compete with large foreign cartels by.
pooling sales and finances as well as by eliminating price conflicts
among themselves. 28 The validity of these arguments from an eco-

nomic standpoint has been questioned.29
III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WEB ACT

The precedents under the Webb Act consist of FTC Reports
and Recommendations on Investigations of practices of particular
associations under the Act and of judicial decisions in three cases:
the Alkali,30 Minnesota Mining,31 and Concentrated Phosphate
cases,$2 decided respectively in 1948-49, 1950, and 1968. In Concentrated Phosphate the Supreme Court for the first time decided a case involving a Webb association on the merits. The
Court's consideration in the prior Alkali case was limited to a jurisdictional issue.
25. Study of Monopoly Power: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Study

of Monopoly Power of the House Judiciary Comm., 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 112
(1950) (excerpt from President Woodrow Wilson's address to Congress on Dec.
5, 1916) [hereinafter cited as Monopoly Power Hearings].
26. Id.

27. 55 CONG. REc. 3569 (1916).
28. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON COOPERATION IN AMERICAN ExPORT TRADE 8 (1916).

29. See, e.g., Fournier, The Purposes and Results of the Webb-Pomerene
Law, 22 AM. EcoN. REV. 18 (1932).

30. United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 58 F. Supp. 785
(S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 325 U.S. 196 (1945) (jurisdictional issue), aff'd, 86 F.
Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (on the merits).
31. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D.
Mass. 1950).
32. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199
(1968).
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A. The Alkali Case-Jurisdiction; Joining Foreign Cartels
The Alkali case initially raised the question whether the Attorney General could bring an independent suit against Webb3

Pomerene associations for antitrust violations in foreign trade.

The defendants contended that the Commission first had to make
an investigation and issue recommendations, then refer the matter to the Attorney General. 4 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding that the powers of the Commission under the
Webb Act were only investigatory and that there was no intention
to repeal either the jurisdiction given to the district courts or the
power given to the Attorney General to bring actions under section 4 of the Sherman Act.3 5 The Supreme Court went on to say
that "there is no basis for interpreting the statute as though it
had been contrived to prevent hostile action rather than to encourage efficient cooperation between the Commission and the
Department of Justice.''

After the disposition of the jurisdictional question, the Alkali
case was decided on the merits in the district court.3 7 The defendants, including two export associations, the United States corporations which were members of one or the other of the export
associations, and a British corporation, Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., (ICI) admitted agreements among themselves and with
other foreign producers, including I.G. Farben, the giant German
chemical company, to allocate world markets in alkalis. Alkasso,
the primary export association, had as members eleven of the
most important alkali-producing companies in the United States.
The purpose of the association was to handle all sales of its members in foreign markets. In 1929 and 1933 Alkasso made agreements with Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. in which, inter
alia, Alkasso was given a one-quarter share of total exports from
the United Kingdom and the United States. Alkasso and ICI

promised to sell at agreed prices in markets not specifically enumerated, and Alkasso agreed not to ship to the continent of Europe or to the British Empire, including Australia and New Zea33. United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 325 U.S. at 198.
34. Id. at 200-01.

35. 15 U.S.C. § 4.
36. United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 325 U.S. at 209.
37. United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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land.3 8 In 1936 Belgian Solvay, a Belgian corporation, became a
party to a tripartite arrangement with Alkasso and ICI. That arrangement prescribed some exclusive territories and some joint
territories and established percentage quotas for the latter.39
There was also evidence of collateral market arrangements which
included I.G. Farben. 4 0 The defendants relied entirely upon the
exemption given by the Webb Act and contended that by virtue
of that statute the antitrust laws had no applicability to a division of territories outside of the United States, to the establishment of exclusive foreign markets, or to the fixing of prices with
foreign competitors in foreign markets. 1
After stating that such activities would be a violation of the
Sherman Act apart from any immunity afforded by the Webb
Act, the court held that the defendants' actions were in restraint
of the export trade of domestic competitors of the association.
The court stated: "[F]or as long as one rival of an export association sought to vend his wares in foreign territory, international
agreements of the kind here involved could do naught but restrain his trade.' 4 2 The court also mentioned that such agreements would stifle potential competition. 43 The court concluded

that the practices of allocating exclusive markets, fixing prices on
an international scale, and selling through joint agents with foreign competitors were not "agreements in the course of export
trade."' 44 The decision was predicated upon an interpretation of

the Webb Act as forbidding these activities in foreign markets
whether or not the United States was a territory embraced by
cartel agreement. Here, however, the court did find that the parties intended to include the United States in the market partitioning despite the deletion in proposed agreements of any provisions expressly including it. 4 5 The court did not doubt that

limiting imports to the United States substantially lessened competition and restrained trade within the United States. 6
38. Id. at 65.
39.

Id.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

67.
65.
70.
71-73.
73-74.
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B. The Minnesota Mining Case-Joint Foreign Manufacture
The Minnesota Mining'7 court stated that a major issue in the
case turned on the defendants' joint establishment of manufacturing companies in England, Canada, and Germany, and a minor
issue turned on their use of a Webb-Pomerene export association.48 Here, nine United States domestic corporations (later reduced to four), manufacturers of coated abrasives, had formed an
export company, Durex Abrasives Corporation. The manufacturing companies also formed jointly owned foreign subsidiary companies in Great Britain, Canada, and Germany to manufacture
coated abrasives in foreign countries, and a United States holding
company, the Durex Corporation (Durex), to hold the stock of the
foreign companies and to hold foreign patents." The export company used three methods of distribution: (1) through distributors
in foreign countries (some distributors were exclusive in a particular area); (2) through sales to domestic exporters (at a higher
price, however, than to the company's foreign distributors); and
(3) through the foreign subsidiaries which were jointly owned by
the member companies.50 The member companies entered into
agreements with Durex, the holding company, to license all of
their foreign patents relating to coated abrasives, but reserved the
right to fix prices and standards of manufacture for the products
manufactured. 5 ' These licenses were passed on to the joint foreign
subsidiaries. With the exception of sales to the export company
and certain other immaterial exceptions, these licenses were exclusive, not only for foreign manufacture, but also for export sales
from the United States. 2 Durex agreed not to import to the
United States any products in which the patented inventions
were used.5 3 No agreements were made between the export company and Durex or between the export company and any of the
foreign subsidiaries. In situations in which economic and political
conditions made it unprofitable for the export company to export,
it arranged for a Durex subsidiary to supply the particular article
and, gradually, through express agreement or practice or through
47. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D.Mass. 1950).
48. Id. at 958.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 951.
Id.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 954-55.
Id. at 954.
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the appointment by the export company of the foreign subsidiaries as its agents, the foreign subsidiaries supplied much of the
market formerly supplied by the export company. 4
The court held 55 that agreement by the dominant United
States manufacturers of coated abrasives (controlling four-fifths
of the export trade) not to ship to particular areas but to do business there through jointly owned foreign factories was a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court also held that the
effect of the arrangement was to deprive United States competitors of access to the foreign markets.5 6 The court decided that the
Webb Act provided no immunity for the defendants' conduct because it was limited to "that sort of 'export trade'. . which consists of 'commerce in goods . . . exported . . . from the United
States . . . to any foreign nation.' ,,11
The court even speculated
in passing that the export arrangement might be an unreasonable
per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act as a restraint of
"commerce among the several States. 51 8 Because joint manufacturing activity abroad (in contrast to joint exporting) is not covered by the Webb Act, the court suggested that the Government
might have alleged that the joint foreign factories, like joint domestic price fixing, were unreasonable per se as a restraint on the
domestic United States market. 59
C. The Concentrated Phosphate Case-Government

Sponsored Programs Are Not Export Trade
The Supreme Court reviewed the Webb-Pomerene Act in its
ConcentratedPhosphate0 decision in 1968. The Court, reversing
the lower court, held that the Webb Act did not cover joint overseas sales by an export association of commodities financed by
the United States Government under the foreign aid program.6 1
The district court had held that the activities in question, the sale
and the shipment of fertilizer to Korea, were "act[s] done in the

54. Id. at 955.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 961.
Id. at 961-62.
Id. at 963.
Id. at 961-62.
Id.
393 U.S. 199 (1968).
Id. at 209-10.
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course of export trade" under section 2 of the Webb Act.6 2
Though the district court found that the foreign aid transactions
were "initiated, directed, controlled and financed" by the Agency
for International Development (AID), it concluded that the form
of the transactions, a direct sale abroad, was controlling.63 The
Supreme Court, however, concluded that because AID retained
effective control over the shipments at every stage through final
payment, the "economic reality" was that the United States was
furnishing the fertilizer to Korea.14 The Court also noted that the
burden of the noncompetitive prices fell on the United States taxpayer.6 5 Looking to the legislative history of the Webb Act, the
Court found that its primary purpose was to protect United
States businesses from foreign cartels and that great pains were
taken to ensure that application of the Act would not injure domestic interests. 6 On remand, Judge Ryan entered a final judgment agreed to by the parties which enjoined each of the defendants from agreeing on prices or allocating business through a
Webb association when the transaction was known
to involve
67
government financing under a foreign aid program.
The Supreme Court, in the course of its opinion, took note of
the legislative history of the Webb-Pomerene Act and made some
observations concerning it. According to the Court, the Webb Act

was passed "[tjo aid and encourage our manufacturers and producers to extend our foreign trade," and "Congress felt that
American firms needed the power to form joint export associations in order to compete with foreign cartels.

6

8

The Court ob-

served, however, that the Act was carefully "hedged" to prevent
injury to domestic business.6 9 Further, in the Court's view, Congress had concluded that the Webb Act would increase United
States foreign trade "without depriving American consumers of
the main advantages of competition.

' 70

Producers of phosphate fertilizer earlier had faced antitrust
62. See id. at 201 (1968).
63. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 273 F. Supp.
263, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 199 (1968).
64. ConcentratedPhosphateExport Ass'n, 393 U.S. at 204-09.
65. Id. at 209.
66. Id. at 207-08.
67. That judgment was entered on Mar. 25, 1969.
68. ConcentratedPhosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. at 206.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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trouble with their export sales. The Federal Trade Commission
investigated the Phosphate Export Association and made recommendations to it for the readjustment of its business in 1946.1 In
1963, the Department of Justice brought two indictments and a
civil suitV2 relating to phosphate rock and triple superphosphate.

The cases did not involve Webb associations, but the complaints
alleged that the defendants (without benefit of the Webb Act)
fixed prices, allocated sales, and sold through common export
agents. The defendants in the criminal cases pleaded nolo contendere, and the civil case was dismissed.7 3
A case similar to the Concentrated Phosphate case, United
States v. Anthracite Export Association,74 concerned the joint
sales by members of an export association of anthracite coal to
the United States Army in Europe. The complaint charged that
the defendant members of the Anthracite Export Association bid
jointly for the supply of coal to army installations in Europe, allocated the supply, and sold exclusively through a common sales
agent, Foreston Coal Company, and its afliated export company.7 5 Participation was limited to the association members and
certain other selected producers. A consent judgment, entered in
197071 following the Supreme Court's Concentrated Phosphate
decision, enjoined the defendants from jointly controlling the
prices or allocating amounts of anthracite coal to be supplied to
the army. The defendants were enjoined from agreeing not to
compete and from selling through a common agent or to a com71. In re Phosphate Export Ass'n, 42 F.T.C. 555, 848 (1946).
72. United States v. International Ore & Fertilizer Corp., [1961-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 45,064 (M.D. Fla. 1964); United States v.
International Mining & Chem. Corp., [1961-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 45,063 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (indictment filed, phosphate rock); United
States v. International Ore & Fertilizer Corp., [1961-1970 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REQ. REP. (CCH)
45,063 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (indictment filed, triple
superphosphate).
73. The claim of the defendant, International Ore & Fertilizer Corporation,

was dismissed after its acquisition by Occidental Petroleum Corporation. Thereafter, the remaining defendants were dismissed without prejudice because conditions in the industry had changed. See International Ore & Fertilizer Corp.,
[1961-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) u45,064.

74. [1961-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 45,065 (M.D. Pa.
1965) (complaint filed).
75. Id.
76. United States v. Anthracite Export Ass'n, 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH)
73,348 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
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mon purchaser for resale when supplying the United States
Army's European bases.
Besides proceeding with the three named cases, the Department of Justice brought a suit against the Electrical Apparatus
Export Association7 7 and a suit against the California Rice Exporters, a Webb association, which concerned only interstate
78
trade and exports to Hawaii and Puerto Rico.
The complaint in another case, United States v. American

Lead Pencil,79 did not join a Webb association as defendant but

charged the association's four member lead pencil companies with
agreeing to refrain from establishing sales or manufacturing outlets in foreign companies without one another's prior consent.
The complaint also charged them with agreeing to refrain from
exporting to foreign countries in which any of the defendants controlled lead pencil manufacturing facilities except at prices agreed
upon by all defendants. A consent decree enjoining defendants
from such agreements was entered on February 5, 1954.80
The Federal Trade Commission also has instituted a number of
investigations under the Webb Act and has made findings and
orders directed to such associations. These findings and orders
define the scope of the Webb Act and what activities may be legally conducted under it. These are noted by the Commission in
its rules for export associations as set forth in section V of this
Article.
IV.

CURRENT OPERATIONS OF EXPORT ASSOCIATIONS UNDER THE

WEBB ACT

The FTC brochure, which summarizes how the Webb Act operates and which is distributed to applicant associations, states that
there are three types of associations: (1) those which act as a central selling agent for all of the members, take orders, negotiate
sales, and handle the shipment of the goods; (2) those which di-

rect the exports of their members and retain certain functions in
export trade but allow orders to be placed by agents already es-

77.

United States v. Electrical Apparatus Export Ass'n, 1946-1947 Trade

Cas. (CCH) %57,546 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)(consent decree entered).

78. United States v. California Rice Exporters, [1890-1951] Fed. Antitrust
Laws (CCH) 409 (N.D. Cal. 1951) (indictment returned; three defendants dismissed, others acquitted by jury, Jan. 15, 1952).

79. 1954 Trade Cas. (CCH)
80. See id.

67,676 (D.N.J. 1954).
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tablished by the members abroad (in this case the export department of one member may handle foreign orders for several members); and (3) those which buy the members' products and resell
them abroad at terms agreed upon by the members."" The FTC
further states that operations (1) and (2) may be combined; that
is, members can use their own agents in some markets and the
associations' agents or offices in other markets, particularly for
new markets
or for those in which the trade is not well
82
developed.

The Commission sets out the following as current Webb association functions: 3
(1) serving as export agent for the members in all or some of
their markets and for all or some of their products;
(2) purchasing products for resale from the members;
(3) employing agents, directing members' agents, and promoting conferences and agreements in export trade;
(4) exploiting members' products abroad, especially in new
markets, and promoting members' brands and patented goods;
and
(5) agreeing with members upon prices for export and adopting
uniform contract forms.
The Commission stresses that the most important role of the
association articles is to describe the acts to be done or the powers to be exercised."4 A sample form for Webb Association Articles is enclosed as part of the brochure.
On January 5, 1982, there were thirty-nine registered WebbPomerene Export Trade Associations, up from twenty-nine four
years ago when the FTC made its last broad study of the associations."5 As in 1978, association membership presently varies from
a few members to sixty-six firms in one association. The present
roster has some very large companies and some groups of many
small companies. Among the former, the Motion Picture Export
Association of America, Inc. and two other film associations have
the primary film companies as members; the American Frozen
81.

FEDERAL TRADE

FUNCTIONS

82.
83.

COMMISSION,

BROCHURE FOR EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION

(1982) [hereinafter cited as FTC ASSOCIATION

FUNCTIONS BROCHURE].

Id.
Id.

84. Id.
85.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISISON STAFF REPORT, WEBB-POMERENE AssoCA-

TIONS: TEN YEARS LATER

(1978) [hereinafter cited as FTC

REPORT].
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Food Export Association, Inc. includes such companies as General
Foods Corporation, Pillsbury Consumer Food Export Group, and
Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.; the Phosphate Chemical Export Association, Inc. includes American Cyanamid Company, W.R. Grace,
and Freeport Chemical Company; and the Pulp, Paperboard Export Association of the United States includes such companies as
Georgia-Pacific Corporation, ITT-Rayonier, Inc., St. Regis Paper
Company, and Scott Paper Company. The Sulphur Export Association now has only two members: Freeport Minerals Company
and Texasgulf, Inc. The United States Cigarette Export Association has three cigarette companies: Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Philip Morris, Inc., and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.
The other associations cover a wide range of products, but the
following agricultural products predominate: cotton (this association has the largest membership), peanuts, poultry, avocados,
dried fruit, rice, citrus fruits, general produce, and tobacco. Other
products are wood chips and wood fibre, coal, furniture, soda ash,
and grease products.86
The latest figures on the proportion of trade handled by Webb
associations are contained in the 1978 FTC Report." This report
revised the 1962 percentages and indicated that these associations
accounted for $499 million or 2.3 percent of the total United
States exports of $21.4 billion. In 1978 the FTC staff concluded
that Webb associations in 1976 handled United States exports of
$1.725 billion or 1.5 percent of total United States exports of $114
billion.88 These figures show the dramatic increase of United
States exports from 1963 to 1976. With much greater United
States exports in 1981, Webb associations now probably represent
two or three percent. In contrast, Webb associations in their heyday accounted for or "assisted" over twelve percent of United
States exports.89 Quantatively, however, Webb exports are a very
large figure, and for companies in such associations this cooperative form of export has been very important.
86. Roster of companies provided by the FTC.
87. FTC REPORT, supra note 85.
88. Id. at 15.
89. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT: WEBB-POMERENE AsSOCIATIONS: A FIFrY YEAR REVIEW 23 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FTC FIFrY
YEAR REVIEW].
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V. FTC Vmw OF ACTIVITIES PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED BY THE
WEBB ACT

The Federal Trade Commission brochure of instructions sent to

Webb association applicants defines "export" as follows:
"Export" is, insofar as consistent with law, defined as any act relating to offer, promise or performance of export by the association or
its members from the United States, of goods, wares and merchandise, and not consisting of producing or manufacturing within the
United States, nor of selling within the United States for consumption within the United States nor of selling within the United
States for resale within the United States.9 0
The form "articles" for an association empowers an association,

"[iln any foreign country or area, to do any act that is lawful or
customary there, subject only to the policy and antitrust laws of
the United States, with such additional leeway as the Webb law
authorizes."9 1
The FTC includes a brochure listing practices permitted and
practices prohibited in the materials it sends to applicant associations. In brief, under the FTC rules an association may engage in
the following activities:
1. An association may provide that all export sales of members
are to be made through the association even though this covers a
large percentage of industry sales.2
2. An association may reasonably restrict a member's right to
withdraw and may for a limited time reasonably restrict a withdrawing member's competition with the association. 3
3. An association may fix the prices and terms of export sale
whether it functions by account or by placing orders on behalf of
the members. 4
90. FTC ASSOCIATION FUNCTIONs BROCHURE, supra note 81, subtitle 9 (Association Functions).
91. Id. (Articles of (Incorporation) (Association)).
92.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BROCHURE FOR ExPORTERs, AcTVITS AND

PRACTICES 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FTC AcTw-s BROCHURE]. In support,
the FTC cites United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947,

965 (D. Mass. 1950), as well as a number of FTC cases. The FTC also cites
United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (because evidence existed of actions intended to stifle exports, such an
association was prohibited).
93. FTC AcTmTIs BROCHURE, supra note 92, at 2.

94. Id. at 3.
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4. An association may allocate exclusive trade areas by itself, or
with cartels if the United States is excluded from the agreement.95 The Commission cites several FTC cases on this point. If
by this the Commission means that an association may agree with
a foreign cartel to sell only in Canada or South America and not
in Europe in return for an agreement by the cartel to sell only in
Europe and not in Canada or South America, the author would
disagree. Such an agreement would affect United States exports.
The Alkali case96 discussed above would appear to forbid these
arrangements, as would the classic cartel cases.9
5. An association may assign quotas on exports by its members.
This would appear to be permitted so long as there is no discrimination, especially against a smaller member.
6. An association may select its own exclusive distributors or
brokers.98
The Commission lists first among its prohibited practices any
agreements which may restrain the export of domestic producers.
These include agreements not to compete with nonmembers or
arrangements whereby the exports of nonmembers are to be deducted from the export quota of the association. The purpose of
such agreements is to curtail nonmembers' exports. Also, an association cannot prohibit members from selling to nonmember domestic exporters or deduct such sales from a member's quota.
A second class of prohibited practices restricts the right of domestic producers to compete within the United States as, for example, when these producers control or attempt to control the
terms or conditions of sales within the United States. 9 Associations cannot restrict imports into the United States or fix prices
within the United States.
A third class of prohibitions concerns practices said to unlawfully restrict actual or potential imports into the United States. 100

It is not clear why the Commission uses the "said to" phrase because its recommendations in past investigations are cited. These
95. Id. at 3-4.
96. 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).

97. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1946) (imports into the United States were in terms excluded per agreement
among foreign producers with a United States manufacturer).
98. FTC AcTwxrrxs BROCHURE, supra note 92, at 1-4.
99. Id. at 5.

100. Id. at 5-7.
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practices include price fixing in the United States 1 ' and agreements with foreign producers in which the United States is included as an exclusive trade area. 102 Both of these practices are
certainly illegal. Another prohibition concerns stock ownership by
foreign producers when the markets supplied by these foreign
producers might in the absence of said companies be supplied
from the United States. 10 3 Still another prohibition0 4 tracks the
0 5 discussed earlier.
opinion in ConcentratedPhosphate'
Other prohibited practices listed are gleaned from recommendations of the Commission in particular cases. Thus, an association has been prohibited from, inter alia, the following acts or
agreements: guaranteeing foreign producers the right to sell in a
given area above sales there by the association;10 6 discriminating
between its members as to the right of withdrawal or restricting
competition of a member after withdrawal;10 7 conducting its office

operations jointly with a domestic trade association;108 agreeing to
"maintain the status quo" in the world market;109 and having foreign purchasers or customers as members. 10 A general prohibition or order has required associations to file the information required by statute (e.g., information relating to agreements with
101.

Id. at 6. The FTC cites Pipe Fitters and Valve Export Ass'n, 45 F.T.C.

917 (1948) and Export Screw Ass'n of the United States, 43 F.T.C. 980 (1947).
102. FTC AcTIVmTIEs BROCHURE, supra note 92, at 6. The FTC cites the following decisions in support: United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n,
86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Export Screw Ass'n of the United States, 43

F.T.C. 980 (1947); Phosphate Export Ass'n, 42 F.T.C. 555 (1946).
103. FTC ACTIVITIES BROCHURE, supra note 92, at 7. The FTC cites the following decisions in support: United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92
F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950); General Milk Co., 44 F.T.C. 1355 (1947); Export
Screw Ass'n of the United States, 43 F.T.C. 980 (1947).
104. FTC ACTIVITIES BROCHURE, supra note 92, at 9.

105.
106.
Corp.,
107.

42 F.T.C. 555 (1946).
FTC ACTIVITIES BROCHURE, supra note 92, at 7; see Sulphur Export
43 F.T.C. 820 (1947).
FTC ACTIVITIES BROCHURE, supra note 92, at 7; see Phosphate Export

Ass'n, 42 F.T.C. 555 (1946); see also United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
108. FTC ACTIVITIES BROCHURE, supra note 92, at 8; see Carbon Black Ex-

port, Inc., 46 F.T.C. 1245 (1949).
109. FTC ACTIVITIES BROCHURE, supra note 92, at 8; see Sulphur Export
Corp., 43 F.T.C. 820 (1947).
110. FTC ACTIVITIES BROCHURE, supra note 92, at 8; see Phosphate Export
Ass'n, 42 F.T.C. 555 (1946).
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members and agreements with foreign companies or cartels).111
The Commission's rules generally appear to be consistent with
the provisions of the Webb Act and its court interpretations.
VI.

CURRENT EXPORT POLICIES OF UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN
ANTITRUST AGENCIES

On several occasions, Department of Justice policy makers have
advocated repeal of the export exemption, claiming that it is antithetical to the antitrust philosophy of the United States.' 2 They
also argued that the Webb Act is unnecessary because the Sherman Act does not cover export practices not injurious to United
States domestic trade. The Department's Antitrust Guide for International Operations (Guide) has stated the view that, given
the limitations imposed by the Webb-Pomerene Act, activities of
collective export associations of United States producers covered
by that Act are subject to constraints "broadly consistent" with
the general policies of the Sherman Act.113 The Guide's position is
that "transactions outside the coverage of the Webb-Pomerene
Act will [not] be subject to substantially different rules under the
Sherman Act. 111 4 If the Guide's position were carried to its logical
conclusion, there would be no need for the Webb-Pomerene Act.
Nevertheless, the Department has not always adhered to the
Guide's statements. In the past the Department has brought several price fixing cases against exporters not protected by the
Webb-Pomerene Act.11 5 Actually, one reason for the Webb exemption was the doubt in 1918 about the legality of export as-

sociations under the Sherman Act. 116 It thus may be impossible to

111. FTC ACTIVITIES BROCHURE, supra note 92, at 8; see supra the orders in
cases cited in notes 53-55.
112. See, e.g., International Aspects of Antitrust, Review of the WebbPomerene Act of 1918, Hearings on S. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 122, 122-24 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. Res. 261; Interview
with Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 875, at AA1, AA3 (Aug. 8, 1975).
113.

'DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DmSION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR IN-

4 (1977). For an update and analysis of the GUIDE, see
Fox, Updating the Antiturst Guide on International Operations-A Greener
Light for Export and Investment Abroad, in this issue at 709.
114. Id.
115. See generally note 72 for examples of such cases.
116. Monopoly Power Hearings, supra note 25, at 112 (excerpt from PresiTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
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have the best of all worlds; perhaps we cannot drop the exemption and thereby make our domestic and foreign antitrust philosophy completely consistent while at the same time carving out
exports from Sherman Act coverage.
There is another way to achieve greater consistency in domestic
and export antitrust policy- even with an export exemption. The
Department of Justice recently reverted to its customary position
after a period of observing a contrary policy. This policy change
was stated by Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter as
follows:
This statute [Webb-Pomerene] expressly exempts from the prohibition of the Sherman Act associations entered into for the sole
purpose of engaging in export trade.... Assuming that other nations had similar laws, we would consider it appropriate to prosecute similarly formed private cartels aimed at our marketplace.
Both the United States and the Common Market have attacked
export cartel activity
abroad which has restrained competition in
117
their market place.

Under the prior, contrary policy, the Department did not bring
actions against foreign export associations similar to Webb
associations. 118
Though the Department of Justice espouses Mr. Baxter's view,
it has continued to indicate some concern for foreign prosecution
of export associations. In a recent speech, Mr. Charles Stark,
Chief of the Antitrust Division's Foreign Commerce Section, referred to a European Commission investigation of a WebbPomerene association on which there had been consultations between the United States Department of Justice and the European
Commission (EC).11 9 The EC stated in these consultations that it
did not intend to proceed automatically against Webb associations active in the Common Market, but that the activities of
such associations could violate Common Market law regardless of
dent Woodrow Wilson's address to Congress on Dec. 5, 1916).
117. Address by William F. Baxter before the ABA International Law Section, in Washington D.C. (Sept. 29, 1981) (Antitrustin an Independent World).

118. See Discussion of Letter from Assistant Attorney General Donald I.
Baker to Senator Edward W. Kennedy, ATrrRUST &
No. 807, at A-24 (Mar. 29, 1977).

TRADE

REG. REP. (BNA)

119. See Remarks of Charles G. Stark before the World Trade Institute
Seminar on Advanced International Antitrust Practices and Related Trade Issues, in San Francisco (May 20, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Stark, Remarks].
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their United States antitrust immunity. 120

A district court recently has held that there is no implied exemption under United States law for foreign buyers who cooperate in order to meet the joint action of members of a Webb association.'12 A British court, however, upheld 1such
a defense for a
22
cooperative buying cartel under British law.
VII.

VARIOUS VIEWS ON THE NEED AND UTILITY OF THE EXPORT
TRADE ExCEPTION

During hearings on the Webb Act in 1967123 the Commerce Department favored strengthening the Act, and the Justice Department (through Assistant Attorney General Turner) advocated its

repeal. In these hearings the Federal Trade Commission said that
it could "conceive of a limited range of circumstances" in which
United States firms might benefit from a Webb-Pomerene type of
antitrust exemption. 124 Accordingly, in the Commission's view
Webb exemptions should be limited to those firms which could
demonstrate a need for them. In addition, both the Commission
and the Justice Department felt that they need not prove that an
association's activities produced actual anticompetitive effects,
but only that the activities could probably result in future adverse effects on domestic trade. 25 These views also are reflected
in the Policy Conclusions and Recommendations of a 1967 FTC
120. See id. (European Commission Communication).
121. In Daishowa Int'l v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,774 (N.D. Cal. 1982), a Japanese company contended that it was entitled to
an implied exemption from the United States antitrust laws for foreign joint
cooperative action to counter a Webb-Pomerene association's joint action as sellers of wood chips to Japan.
122. In 1963 the British Restrictive Practices Court rendered an opinion upholding the legality of a buying cartel under British restrictive practices law on
the basis of a monopoly of supply by United States sulphur companies through
a Webb association. The agreement of the British National Sulphuric Acid Association established a nonprofit pool which arranged for the joint purchase of all
of the acid-making sulphur required by the members. It was shown that Sulexco,
the United States Webb-Pomerene association, was the preponderant sulphur

supplier to Great Britian. The buying pool was sustained on the ground that it
was necessary to bargain with to secure fair terms from Sulexco. See Re National Sulphuric Acid Ass'ns Agreement, 1963 L.R. 4 R.P. 169.
123. See Hearings on S. Res. 26, supra note 112.
124. Id. at 139-40.
125. Id.
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staff report. 12 6
The 1967 FTC staff report stated that "a half century of experience with the Webb-Pomerene Act reveals that Associations
have not proven to be effective instruments either for the expansion of overall exports or for the expansion of exports by small
firms. ' 127 While the report did not advocate outright repeal of the
Webb Act, it suggested restrictions on association membership
and limitations on the antitrust exemption. 2 8 A more recent FTC
staff report entitled Webb-Pomerene Associations: Ten Years
Later1 29 stated: "Today, export trade associations are again attracting interest as a potential vehicle for boosting exports. ' 130 On

the other hand, the report conceded that "there is continued
skepticism about the need for and scope of antitrust exemptions."1 31 In 1977, a Justice Department Task Force on Antitrust
Immunities, 13 2 after completing a two-year study, brushed aside
the Webb-Pomerene Act with the observation that its economic
effects were not sufficient for a detailed study.13 3 The State Department witness, Harold A. Levin, in his testimony at the 1967
hearings, cited with approval the views of Professor Kingman
Brewster 34 as outlined in his book Antitrust and American Business Abroad.1 3 5 Professor Brewster advocated repeal of the Webb
Act, but he stated that "further inquiry might urge a power to
grant exemption on an ad hoc basis in special situations" for inneed to bargain collectively
dustries that could show a particular
36
restrictions.
foreign
of
face
in the
In a 1971 report, the President's Commission on International
Trade and Investment Policy (the Williams Commission) concluded that the Webb Act's "usefulness for United States export-

126. FTC FIFTY YEAR REVIEW, supra note 89, at 67-70.
127. Id. at 61.
128. Id. at 69-70.

129. FTC

REPORT,

supra note 85.

130. Id. at 2.
131. Id.
132. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES

(1977).

133. Id. at 21-22.
134. Hearings on S. Res. 26, supra note 112, at 61-67.
135. K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
(1958); see K.

BREWSTER

& J. ATWOOD,

ANTITRUST

ABROAD § 19.06 (2d ed. 1981).
136. K. BREWSTER, supra note 135, at 456.

&

ABROAD

AMERICAN

454-56

BUSINESS
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ers ha[d] been narrowed by judicial and administrative interpretation. 1 37 The report criticized the Webb Act because it did not
apply to services or to consortia to build large capital projects.138
Peter Peterson, Assistant to the President, expressed a somewhat
similar view in his 1972 report entitled A ForeignEconomic Perspective, in which he stated that our antitrust laws "may contain
certain inhibiting disadvantages to many patented exporters.' ' I 9
In his opinion the Webb Act had not proved effective in offsetting
14 0
these disadvantages.
In 1979 the National Committee for the Review of the Antitrust Laws devoted one chapter to Webb-Pomerene associations.14 At the urging of the Commerce Department, the President appointed the Business Advisory Panel to report to the
142
Commission on issues pertaining to the Webb-Pomerene Act.
After interviewing witnesses from the private sector and government officials, the panel recommended the following: (1) the export exemption should be retained because it is heavily utilized
by certain industries; (2) the Webb Act should be extended to
cover services as well as goods; (3) the antitrust enforcement
agencies should begin investigations regarding the domestic anticompetitive effect of export associations and, when they find
misuse, they should bring antitrust actions; and (4) the Webb Act
should be modified to make it clear that upon adoption of an international treaty regarding export associations the United States
4
will conform its internal law to the requirements of the treaty."
The Commission disagreed with most of the Business Advisory
Panel's recommendations but did note that "it is generally agreed
today that the act has failed to promote United States exports
137.

COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, REPORT

TO THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTER-

120 (1971).
138. Id.
139. P. PETERSON, A FOREIGN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 43 (1972).
140. Id.
141. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL (1979) [hereinafter
cited as NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT].
DEPENDENT WORLD

142.

Export Trade Companies and Trade Associations: HearingsBefore the

Subcomm. on InternationalFinance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and UrbanAffairs, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 171 (1979) (report of Business Advisory Panel in Antitrust Export Issues).

143. Id. at 173-74.
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materially during its sixty years in existence. ' 144 Furthermore, the
Commission found that export associations have not generally
been established for the purposes originally envisioned for them:
"[T]he common feature of export associations today is not their
performance or efficiency or cost reducing functions, but rather
the pursuit of traditionalcartel activities.' 145
The Commission set out four arguments against retaining the
special antitrust exemption for export associations: (1) the Act
adversely affects domestic markets, especially among domestic
producers in oligopolistic markets; (2) the exemption is too broad
because there are other means-brokerage or agent arrangements-available for promoting exports without involving compromises on antitrust policy; (3) the original reason for establishing export associations-relief from foreign buying cartels-is no
longer valid; and (4) the Act impedes the United States advocation of strong international antitrust rules. 146 The Commission
also noted some arguments in favor of retaining the exemption:
(1) there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about Webb associations and real benefits can accrue to small manufacturers
who operate in highly concentrated markets if they join together
for the purpose of export; (2) the Act removes the uncertainty
concerning the legality of joint export arrangements; and (3) the
Act can be useful in increasing the volume of export trade. The
Commission also stated that adding services to its coverage would
be useful, especially to small and medium sized companies interested in bidding on large foreign contracts. 147 As part of its recommendations, the Commission suggested that a "legislative reexamination of the necessity of such an exemption is
warranted. 1 4 The Commission further suggested that, if any exemption for export associations were to be retained by Congress,
such an exemption should be granted only upon the showing of a
particular need and the need should be related to the original
purpose of the Act.149 The Commission also would require an association seeking an antitrust exemption to demonstrate that the
proposed association would not adversely affect the domestic or

144.

NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 141, at 298.
145. Id. at 297 (emphasis added).

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 301-02.
Id. at 302.
Id.
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international trade of the United States. 50 Finally, the Commission did accept the recommendation of the Business Advisory

Panel that service industries be granted the same antitrust exemption as manufacturing industries. 51
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) considered the usefulness of export associations, including Webb associations, in its 1974 Report on Export Cartels. The
report was prepared by its Restrictive Business Practices Committee. 1 52 The OECD report pointed out some adverse effects of
export "cartels," as they are labelled; for example, they frequently restrain domestic competition, and there is a danger that
they may become part of noncompetitive international arrangements. According to the report, export cartels may be beneficial if
they are formed by small or medium sized firms which are permitted to participate in export trade and thereby increase international trade. 53 The OECD report found that export associations generally did not achieve the aims for which the exception is
provided. This view reflects the OECD's concern over the adverse
effect on international trade as a whole of export cartels and export arrangements in the various countries. The report suggested
that countries institute a notification procedure on export associations which would cover details about membership, the field
of action, the types of reconstructions involved, and the basic
facts of the business done or planned.""
VIII.

THE NEW EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT

The Export Trading Company Act of 1982, passed by the
97th Congress, was a compromise between differing Senate and
House bills. Both bills, 55 however, were designed to add incentives for exports and to permit banks to invest in export trading
companies. Both bills provided for a certification procedure by
which a company may obtain an exemption from the antitrust
laws for export activities. In the Senate bill this was to be administered by the Secretary of Commerce; in the House bill this duty
150. Id.
151. Id. at 303-04.

152.
153.
154.
155.
No. 27,

supra note 8.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 52-53.
See H.R. Rep. No. 637, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (parts 1&2); S. Rep.
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION,
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was assigned to the Attorney General. H.R. 1799,156 passed by the
House on July 27, 1982, would have allowed an export trading
company to obtain what would amount to a binding advisory
opinion with respect to antitrust liability. 15 7 The Attorney General, rather than the Secretary of Commerce, would have issued
the certificate.
The Export Trading Company Act, as enacted, 15 s provides,
with respect to export exemption, for "export trade certificates of
review" to be issued by the Secretary of Commerce with the concurrence of the Attorney General. 59 The application for such a
certificate is to "specify the conduct limited to export trade" and
include information on the overall market in which the applicant
operates. 16 0 Any individual, partnership, or association, including
a state or local government organization exporting goods or services, or facilitating such export, can apply. "Export trade" includes trade or commerce in goods, wares, merchandise, or services which are exported or are in the course of being exported
from the United States to any other country. 61 "Services" has a
broad meaning including, for example, communication and
financial and professional services.16 2 The applicable definitions
for the exemption are set forth in title III. A special office is to be
set up in the Department of Commerce for the formation of export trade associations and export trading companies.6 3 A signifi156. See House Judiciary Comm., Report on H.R. 1799, H.R. Rep. No. 637,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (part 2) The House of Representatives passed the
House Judiciary Committee's amended H.R. 1799. In its Report, supra, part 1,
however, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives adhered to the original version of H.R. 1799 which followed S. 734. The House of

Representatives designated all three Committees that worked on H.R. 1799, the
Judiciary, Foreign Affairs and Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committees,
to participate in the House-Senate Conference Committee.
157. See 128 CONG. REc. H4634 (daily ed. July 27, 1982)(statement of Rep.
Rodino).
158. Pub. L. No. 97-290. Relevant portions are reprinted at [4 Federal Laws]
25,117, 25,245, 27,000-032; see H.R. Rep. No. 924
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in ANTrIrUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 1084, at 719 (Oct. 7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 924].
159. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 303, [Federal Laws] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
27,023.
160. Id.
161. Id. § 311, reprinted at 27,030.
162. Id. § 311(2), reprinted at T 27,031.
163. Id. § 104, reprinted at 1 27,004.
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cant feature is that the Secretary shall publish in the Federal
Register a notice of the application, a list of the persons submitting it, and a description of the conduct for which the application
is submitted.""
The antitrust standards for issuance of a certificate of review
(section 303(a) standards) incorporate three criteria which are
presently in the Webb Act-(1), (2), and (4) below-and add one
new standard-(3) below. Certification may be granted if export
trade activities and methods of operation will:
(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint of trade within the United States nor a substantial restraint
of the export trade of any competitor of the applicant;
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within
the United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of
the class exported by the applicant;
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competitors engaged in the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services
of the class exported by the applicant; and
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result
in the sale for consumption or resale within the United States of
the . goods, wares, merchandise or services exported by the
applicant. 15
The applicant, in addition to an annual report, shall report any
change as to the matters set out in the certificate, and may ask
for an amendment to cover such changes. 6 If either the Secretary or Attorney General has reason to believe that the activities
of the certificate holder no longer comply with the section 303(a)
standards of the Act set forth above, the Secretary shall request
information which either he or the Attorney General deems necessary. Failure to comply is grounds for revoking the certificate. If

the Secretary or the Attorney General determines that the activities of the holder no longer comply with the section 303(a) standards, a notice shall be sent to the holder to that effect with reasons therefore. Within sixty days after a thirty day period from
the date of the notice, the Secretary shall revoke the certificate,
or modify the certificate as he or the Attorney General deems
necessary, to apply only to such export trade activities as are in
164. Id. § 302(b)(1), reprinted at 27,022.
165. Id. § 303(a), reprinted at 1 27,023.
166. Id. § 304(a)(1), reprinted at 1 27,024.
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compliance.1 67 Civil Investigation Demands (CIDs) may be issued
by the Antitrust Division except that no such CID may be issued
to the holder of the certificate if such person is the target of the
investigation. 168
Any person aggrieved by such a determination may sue in any
appropriate district court to set aside the determination.1 6 If the
Secretary denies a certificate or amends or revokes it, neither the
negative determination nor the reasons therefore shall be admissable in evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding
in support of any claim under the antitrust laws.
Anyone injured by conduct engaged in under a certificate of review may bring a civil action against the certificate holder for injunctive relief and actual damages-including interest and a reasonable attorney's fee-but only for failure to comply with the

section 303(a) standards of the Export Act.170 Such an action
must be brought within two years after the plaintiff has notice of
the certificate holder's failure to comply or in any event within
four years after the cause of action accrues. The action lies exclusively under the Act, not under the antitrust laws generally. In
any such suit there is a presumption of compliance, and if the
court finds that there is compliance, the court shall award the
costs of defending the suit and reasonable attorney's fees to the
certificate holder. The Attorney General also may sue to enjoin
conduct threatening the national interest. Apart from these provisions, the certificate holder, including members of an association
engaged in conduct which is specified in and complies with an
effective certificate, is shielded from all civil and criminal actions
under the "antitrust laws. 1 71 In this connection, "antitrust laws"
are defined to include section 5 of the FTC Act as well as state
antitrust and unfair competition laws.
Because he thought the Senate Export Trading Company bill
too cumbersome, Congressman Rodino had earlier introduced a
short bil 172 in the 97th Congress to exempt joint export activities
from the antitrust laws. Substantially amended, this became the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, title IV of the Export

167. Id. § 304(b)(2), reprinted at

27,024.

168. Id. § 304(b)(3), reprinted at 27,024.
169. Id. § 305, reprinted at T27,025.
170. Id. § 306, reprinted at 27,026.
171. Id. § 306(a) reprinted at 27,026.

172. That bill was introduced as H.R. 2324, 97th Cong., lst Sess. (1981).
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Trading Company Act. It amends the Sherman Act as follows:
Sec. 7. This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations,
of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United
States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this
Act, other than this section.
If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the operations
of paragraph (1)(B), then this Act shall apply to such
conduct only
17 3
for injury to export business in the United States.

Section 5 of the FTC Act is amended similarly. 174 Originally, a
provision would have been added to section 7 of the Clayton Act
to exempt joint ventures in foreign commerce from that Act. This
was deleted from the final legislation. The Export Act provides
that the Secretary of Commerce with the concurrence of the Attorney General shall promulgate regulations under the Act.17 5

The new Export Act is anomalous in many ways. Because it
does not repeal or amend the Webb-Pomerene Act, there are now
two exempting statutes. It covers services, whereas the Webb Act
does not. The new Export Act adopts the standards in the Webb
Act plus an FTC Act standard and specifically provides for an
antitrust suit under these specific standards rather than those of
the Sherman Act. It also amends the Sherman Act, however.
The administration of the new export exemption is placed in
the hands of the Secretary of Commerce rather than the Federal
Trade Commission, but the Secretary's actions must be with the
concurrence of the Attorney General. The Act was passed just
prior to the recess of Congress on October 1, 1982, and thus was
the result of a compromise between those who wanted the entire
exemption to be in the hands of the Commerce Department, and
Congressman Rodino and the House Judiciary Committee, who
173. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402 [4 Federal Laws] TRADE REG. REP.
174. Id. § 403, reprinted at 25,245.

175. Id. § 310, reprinted at 27,030.

25,117.
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wanted it in the Justice Department. Congressman Rodino's original bill, which merely excluded export activities from the Sherman Act in general terms without any administrative procedure,

became part of the Export Act. The Act provides a special exemption for export trade which the proponents of the Senate bill
desired; the activities, however, still must pass muster under antitrust criteria, and any exemption must be approved by the Attorney General. A limited private civil antitrust suit can be brought,
but if the plaintiff loses, he must pay the bill.
In their Report, the Senate and House conferees state that the
standards of the Export Act "encompass the full range of the antitrust laws." 176 The Act's exemption covers the antitrust laws
generally, including section 5 of the FTC Act, and state antitrust
laws. The Webb Act only provides an exemption from the Sherman Act and from the part of section 7 of the Clayton Act that
refers to stock, and not asset, acquisition. Thus, for the first time
there is an export exemption from FTC action under section 5 of
the FTC Act. On the other hand, the Export Trading Company
Act provides that a private antitrust suit can be brought against a
certificate holder if its activities "constitute unfair methods of
competition against competitors. . . . "11 Accordingly, the conferees have exchanged an antitrust suit under the FTC Act by the
Commission for a private antitrust suit under the Export Act. A
certificate will not protect the holder if its activities constitute
unfair methods of competition.
A provision in the House bill to protect joint ventures in foreign commerce from section 7 of the Clayton Act was deleted

from the Export Act. Joint ventures among United States companies would be protected, however, if "limited to export trade,"
and assuming compliance with the section 303(a) standards. The
Webb Act now exempts an association from section 7 stock acquisition restrictions unless trade is restrained or competition lessened "within the United States. 17 8 In view of the precedents
under the Webb Act, a joint venture with a foreign company
would not appear to be eligible for a review certificate.
In contrast to the Webb Act, a single company is eligible to
apply for a review certificate, though a single company in export
176. H.R. Rep. No. 924, supra note 158, at 725.
177. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 304, [4 Federal Laws]
27,024.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 63 (1976).

TRADE REG.
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trade usually would not have to worry about the antitrust laws
except under circumstances in which a certificate would not be

granted in any event. 179 Associations now registered with the FTC
under the Webb Act can continue to be registered and will continue to obtain the Webb exemption. In addition, they can apply
for a certificate of review under the new Act. Other associations
can still avail themselves of both acts.
The main advantage of the certification procedure of the new
Act for an export group is that such an export company or association can obtain a specific exemption certificate for its activities
from the Secretary of Commerce and the Attorney General. The
benefit of the new certification procedure will depend upon the
scope of the actual certificate. Presumably, the Secretary of Commerce will want a broad scope for the certificate and the Attorney
General will want a narrow scope. As long as the certificate holder
stays within the scope of the activities specified in the certificate,
it is immune from criminal and civil antitrust suits, including
state antitrust lawsuits. There still may be a private antitrust suit
for single damages.
The disadvantages of the new Export Act include the somewhat cumbersome administrative procedure and the publicity
given to an applicant's export activities as opposed to mere registration with the FTC; the difficulty in specifying export activities
in detail; and the specific provision against reimportation into the
United States with its accompanying potential liability. Previously, this was only a condition of the immunity. Under the Act
there will also be surveillance by the Department of Justice
rather than the more general supervision of Webb associations by
the FTC.
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, title IV of the

Export Act, originally was envisaged as a House substitute for the
Senate Export Trading Companies bill,180 but the later rationale
for its inclusion was to provide a clear rule for jurisdiction in foreign trade antitrust cases, particularly those involving export.
The House Report quotes Chairman Rodino: "The bill will estab-

179. See, e.g., Branch v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944)
(United States company's representations in conducting a correspondence school
with students in Latin America).
180. See H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1982), reprinted in
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1076, at 306 (Aug. 5, 1982) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 686].
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lish that restraints on export trade only violate the Sherman Act
if they have a direct and substantial effect on commerce within
the United States or on a domestic firm competing for foreign
trade."181 This appears to be a salutary rule which is considerably
clearer than the provisions in the title itself. This title, after
amendments to take care of particular criticisms, contains rather
ambiguous language, such as the reference to conduct "involving"
foreign trade, not a word usually employed in the cases. The formulation in the cases refers to conduct in the "flow" of interstate
or foreign commerce, or a direct and substantial effect on such
commerce.1 8 2 There is also ambiguity as to an effect "on trade or

commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations... [or on import trade]. 1 s3 The latter appears to mean domestic trade or interstate commerce but it is not so stated. The
House Report, however, indicates that the "direct and substantial" effects test with the Restatement "foreseeable" concept
18 4
added, will continue to be the test for foreign trade activities.
Accordingly, while title III in (1)(A) requires such effects on domestic trade or import trade, and (1)(B) demands a showing of an
effect on the export trade of a person engaged in such trade in the
United States, it does not appear that any major jurisdictional
rule change is intended. 85 The Act would change the result of
cases holding 8 " that an injury to foreigners in a foreign country

by reason of restrictions on United States export trade may be
covered by the Sherman Act, an erroneous view under present
law in the author's view. It makes clear that trade between third
countries is not covered by the Sherman Act. According to the
House Report, this title would allow for comity considerations,
but it would appear to require courts which have formulated a
different rule, emphasizing comity and other considerations,187 to
return to the "direct and substantial" rule with "foreseeable"
181. Id. at 7-8, reprinted at 308.
182. See W. FUGATE, supra note 9, §§ 2.9-.10, 2.12-.15.
183. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, [4 Federal Laws] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
25,117.
184. H.R. Rep. No. 686, supra note 180, at 7-8, 13, reprinted at 309-10.
185. Id. at 13, reprinted at 309.
186. See, e.g., Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F.
Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
187. E.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976).
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tacked on to it.185 Despite its ambiguities, title III should give
more assurance
considerations.

to

IX.

exporters

with

respect

to

antitrust

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

It is difficult to make comments or to draw conclusions when
new legislation on export trade has just been enacted. Much will
depend upon the regulations to be issued under the new Export
Act. The Export Trading Company Act is an effort to spur exports. This is a salutary goal. There may be some added incentive
in giving banks an opportunity to invest in export companies. Adding services to the exemption for export trade appears to be an
excellent idea. The reports on the Export Trading Company
bills1 89 adverted to the general "perception in the business community that joint activities that can produce efficiencies in the
export of goods and services may violate American antitrust
law."190 The Senate Report refers to testimony that "the vagueness of the Webb-Pomerene Act leaves uncertain what activities
constitute a substantial restraint of domestic trade." This factor
was a particularly strong consideration for small business. 91
The Export Trading Company Act will give the advantage of

specific clearance for export association activities, while keeping
the safeguards provided in the Webb Act. Despite the questions
now being raised about the new Act, it hopefully will be more
successful than the Webb-Pomerene Act. The certification process may remove fears of unwarranted antitrust prosecution. Such
fears linger even though the Department of Justice has indicated
that few joint export activities are likely to raise antitrust

problems.19 2 The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, ti-

tle IV of the Act, also is intended to remove unwarranted fears of
antitrust prosecution for export activities.
Philosophically, the antitrust exemption for export trade runs
contrary to the thrust of our antitrust laws. If we could agree with
other countries on a mutual elimination of export exemptions, it
188.

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

UNITED STATES § 18

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

(1965).

189. H.R. Rep. No. 637, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)(parts 1&2); S. Rep. No.
27, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981).
190. H.R. Rep. No. 637, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. 9 (part 2).
191. S.Rep. No. 27, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. 18-19 (1981).
192.

See Stark, Remarks, supra note 119.
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would be beneficial to international trade generally. Although the
export exemption has helped United States trade very little,
other countries, such as Japan, make extensive use of export associations. Other countries realistically call these associations "export cartels," but we have been very strict when prescribing what
our associations may do by forbidding international agreements.
Our associations are "cartels" only in a limited sense. Accordingly, from our standpoint, some international agreement curtailing the use of cartels would appear to be to our advantage. In
order to avoid the standoff situation of United States prosecution
of foreign export cartels and foreign prosecution of Webb associations, the United States should try to find a basis for agreement
with other nations on export exemptions from the antitrust laws.
At this time, however, the author believes that the Export
Trading Company Act is a good thing and may aid in spurring
our exports. United States companies should have more assurance
of protection in the use of export companies and associations. At
the same time, the Department of Justice can monitor the use of
such companies to prevent anticompetitive practices. If the certification process reassures small and medium sized companies and
makes exporting attractive to them, the result could be very beneficial to our foreign trade.193

193. See Gaitty, Taking the Plunge in InternationalWaters, NATION'S Bus.
Apr. 1982, at 31. This article details aid to exporters given by the Department of
Commerce and the Small Business Administration.

